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"There is plenty of evidence that unemployment has many far-reaching effects other than loss of income, including psychological harm, loss of work motivation, skill and self-confidence, increase in ailments and morbidity (and even mortality rates), disruption of family relations and social life, hardening of social exclusion, and accentuation of racial tensions and gender asymmetries."
INTRODUCTION
To put an economy on an equitable growth path, economic development must be underpinned by social efficiency, equity, and job creation. The challenge is drawing together the right mix of social, employment, and economic policy to achieve this end.
The employment policy, in particular, should not lead to inflation, interfere with the microdecisions of individual firms, or replace existing jobs. Further, it must not rely upon the fine-tuning of aggregate demand to achieve outcomes. For employment policy, there are several options that appear to meet these criteria: work-time reduction, employment subsidies, and government job creation programs (such as employment guarantee schemes or employer of last resort approaches). The former two have been used extensively and have generated mixed outcomes. Experiments with work-time reduction strategies in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Australia, and Japan have failed to yield employment increase, while employment-subsidy approaches interfere with employer decisions, thereby distorting the market mechanism (Papadimitriou 1998 ).
The employment-subsidy strategy is one of the oldest policies proposed, going as far back as in Pigou (1933) , Kaldor (1936) , Hammermesh (1978) , Haveman and Palmer (1982) , and Phelps (1997) . This strategy entails a partial offset of the cost to firms hiring additional workers from the public purse, but it is unlikely to achieve higher levels of employment, and instead the subsidized job recipient would substitute for the worker currently employed. There are also other forms of wage subsidies that have been used, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States and the negative income tax (Tobin 1966; Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski 1967) in other countries.
The EITC has garnered support (Bluestone and Ghilarducci 1996) for boosting employment and the income of low-paid workers, and criticism (Garfinkel 1973) for not providing inducements for employment growth or incentives to hold onto a job. Any form of wage subsidy, however, would have limited application in some developing countries where the private sector is not sufficiently developed. Similarly, programs that focus on training and increasing employability are also unlikely to stimulate higher levels of labor absorption.
It should be noted that official statistics on levels and rates of unemployment should not be accepted without further inquiry. Ajit Singh 1 has suggested that one needs to define unemployment before discussing it, since the official measures do not reflect what is reality. On the one hand, the extreme definition of zero unemployment comes from the writings of the British economist William Beveridge (1945) as the state of the economy "having always more vacant jobs than the number of unemployed." On the other hand, the official unemployment rate in the United States, for example, does not take into account workers employed in the informal sector or those individuals who are out of the labor force-having been discouraged getting into it or having exhausted their unemployment benefits have stopped looking for a job-but desperately wanting a job. In the next section we present the government direct job creation approach first proposed by Hyman Minsky (1965) from his concerns regarding the impending failure of the War on Poverty in the United States in the 1960s. We then discuss the relationship of such policy to fiscal and monetary policy space. In the subsequent section, we review the empirical evidence for these types of programs, paying particular attention to two of the most successful in Argentina and India. In the final section, we briefly discuss the insights that such a policy can provide to developing countries and the contribution of such policy in fulfilling the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals.
1 Private communication, July 2007.
MINSKY'S EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Hyman Minsky was not the first economist to suggest that government play a role in ensuring full employment. In a very detailed paper, Fadhel Kaboub (2007) has suggested that the idea of government acting as employer of last resort dates as far back as the seventeenth century in the period after the Industrial Revolution when it was recognized that capitalist economies were ill-equipped to facilitate a state of full employment. Thus, we find in the writings of Sir William Petty in 1662 a suggestion that there will be a need for publicly employing the unemployed for building infrastructure, with the added benefits of keeping their "minds to discipline and their bodies to patience of more profitable labours, when need shall require it" (Petty 1899 (Petty [1662 ).
Concerned with the fiscal policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s, Minsky wrote "the liberals" War on Poverty was born out of neoclassical theory in which it is the poor-not the economy-that is to blame for poverty. The War on Poverty tried to "change the poor, not the economy" (Minsky 1971: 20) . In Minsky's view what was missing from the poverty alleviation programs was the government's commitment to full employment and, accordingly, he was proposing an alternative that was based on "a targeted jobs program, paying decent wages that will successfully reduce poverty among the nonelderly in a politically digestible manner" (Minsky 1971: 20 (Forstater 1999; Papadimitriou 1998; Wray 1997) , as well as William Mitchell (1998) , envisaged the government becoming a "market maker for labor" by establishing a "buffer stock of labor." In effect, the government "buys" all unemployed labor at a fixed wage or "sells" it (provides it to the private sector) at a higher wage. The commodity (labor) used as a buffer stock always has a stable price.
Thus, this approach to employment policy ensures full employment with price stability.
In cases where private sector demand is insufficient to provide full employment, unemployment emerges and persists. It is only the government that can divorce profitability from the hiring of workers and can create an infinitely elastic demand for labor (Minsky 1986: 308) . This requires government to take responsibility for providing employment to all those willing and able to work at or marginally below the prevailing informal sector wage. It is important to underscore that an employer of last resort would not and could not replace or eliminate other support programs directed to the disabled, percent-were reversed and followed by the "golden period" of American capitalism.
Is such an approach feasible in a contemporary economy? If we consider the true U.S. unemployment picture presently, as discussed earlier, where over 15 million persons are either unemployed or underemployed, the answer would clearly be in the affirmative.
Would it be affordable and would it be consistent with a fiscally responsible government?
Simulations for the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (which exclude income multiplier effects) reveal that such a program would cost between 1 and 3.5 percent of GDP, which would be affordable for most governments. When the multiplier effects of such a program are considered (resulting from the rising incomes of jobguarantee workers and increased demand), the potential benefits extend far beyond the program budget and wage bill. In regard to monetary policy, government spending increases commercial bank reserves. Excess commercial bank reserves drive overnight interbank interest rates to zero. Therefore, to keep interest rates at a desired rate, the government borrows from the reserves of commercial banks. As borrower of last resort it can effectively fix the overnight interbank interest rate (the central bank sets the interbank rate target). The experience of Japan, which set its interest rate at close to zero throughout the [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] by not paying interest on reserves and net-issuing fewer public bonds than would be required to offset operating factors at the Bank of Japan, clearly illustrates this point.
Interest rates are thus not constrained by the willingness of the private sector to buy government debt or by the size of the government deficit. A government with a fiat currency is not required to borrow or issue debts in order to deficit spend. It follows that the government can always set the overnight interbank interest rate, independent of the size of the deficit or high debt to GDP ratios, without the onset of interest rate increases, currency depreciation, inflation, or destabilization. Therefore, it is possible to finance an employment guarantee program in the same manner that all other government expenditure is financed. Governments spend by crediting bank accounts and tax by The programs in Argentina and India are of particular significance in that they offer the opportunity for lessons to be drawn from their implementation, successes, and needs for improvement. To these, we turn next.
Argentina's Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar
December 2001 saw Argentina's economic and social crisis peak. The social unrest demanded an intervention that would reduce poverty and unemployment, while boosting domestic demand to facilitate recovery of the economy from three years of recession.
Argentina's experience with labor market programs is extensive; previously the government had experimented with training programs, wage subsidies, and various other targeted job creation programs, as well as quota job creation programs such as the Participants were to work in community services, microenterprises (typically agricultural), and small construction/maintenance activities or were to engage in training programs, particularly those concerned with completion of secondary schooling. The
Jefes program was augmented with the Programa de Emergencia Laboural (PEL), which provided the same wage-income benefit and work opportunity for those in need of social assistance, but were not eligible for Jefes. At the program's peak, nearly two million households (1.6 million in Jefes and 300,000 in PEL) were engaged in socially meaningful work opportunities. In total, the two programs represented 5 percent of the population (37 million) and 13 percent of the labor force (Kostzer 2007 ). 
Thus far the assessment of the

India's Employment Guarantee Schemes
India has a long history of guaranteed employment programs, with the largest of them having started some forty years ago in the state of Maharashtra in response to a devastating drought in 1972. The program was organized toward achieving two objectives: guarantee of employment and improvement of rural infrastructure. It was also based on the principle of the right-to-work for everyone over 18 years in the rural areas of the region. The main characteristics of the program included: productive employment, (i.e., labor-based public works projects); projects aimed at improving productivity of agriculture; fixed wages that were based on the quality and quantity of work (piece-rate), but an average workday of good work would earn the day's minimum wage together with some welfare support programs; and lastly, financing of the program was through new taxes and surcharges. The program was supervised by both the Ministry of Planning at the state level and at the district level by the district collector (Hirway and Terhal 1994) .
Productive employment included labor that was primarily devoted to projects such as moisture and water conservation (i.e., irrigation projects, canal construction, percolation, storage tanks, etc.), soil conservation, land development, forestation, roads, and flood prevention and protection (Hirway and Terhal 1994: 109) . The annual program cost has hovered around 1 percent of GDP and, until 2001-02, had cumulatively generated 3.7 billion days of work. During 2001-02 alone, the program generated 160 million days of work at a cost of Rs 9,417 million, representing less than 1 percent of GDP.
The Maharashtra experience has had a number of variegated effects on the projects constructed, conditions of poverty, and the organization of labor. As was the experience with other employment programs in post-colonial India, the program had a number of weaknesses including low coverage, a large fraction of participants were not drawn from the neediest groups, a large bureaucracy, little community involvement, corruption, and limited participation of women. Assessments of the program's overall effectiveness were mixed (Acharya 1990; Godbole 1990; Hirway and Terhal 1994: 111) .
It has, however, been shown that the program was financially sustainable, has generated supplementary employment and income for many workers, and the assets constructed under the aegis of the program have contributed to the growth in agriculture, the dairy industry, and horticulture. Finally, in some segments of the state's labor force, the program has resulted in strengthening the organization of workers and contributed to the impetus that brought about the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA).
The National Rural Employment Guarantee has two objectives: (i) provide a job to landless labor and marginal farmers in nonagricultural seasons, and (ii) create durable assets to increase land productivity that will reverse decreasing agricultural output (Mehrotra 2008) . These objectives will be accomplished by guaranteed employment of least 100 days to poor rural adults, within a five-kilometer radius of their homes, at the statutory minimum wage along with some training and upgrading of skills, as well as offering subsidized children's daycare costs to those who need it. The legislation's first phase, beginning in 2006, covers the 200 poorest rural districts and, within five years, is to cover all rural districts of the entire country (Antonopoulos 2007 ).
The national program was also designed to remedy many of the weaknesses of previous programs. It introduced a rights-based framework, a legal guarantee to employment that could not be budgeted-out at will, fulfillment of job requests within 15 days, providing incentives for performance and disincentives for nonperformance, and instituting demand-based resource availability and accountability of program results through social audits (Mehrotra 2008: 27) . (Mehrotra 2008: 30-32) . The implementation of an ELR program for developing countries is, nevertheless, particularly challenging and will most likely need to be accomplished in stages. The program's monetary wage must be equal to the average wage in the informal sector and 3 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/1 and the 2006 Economic and Social Council, E/2006/L.8 state that the UN must "Make full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of relevant national and international policies and national development strategies and to be part of efforts to achieve the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals" (quoted in Kregel [2006] ).
CONCLUSION
should include some market provision of necessities, for example, domestically produced food and clothing, shelter, and other basic services (Wray 2007) . Priority needs to be given to infrastructure development to reduce business costs and attract private investment. Each community project should be administered and supervised locally and should not compete with the private sector. Finally, financing and technical assistance will be needed through international aid, and the majority of expenditures should be directed to domestically produced goods with no impact on goods imports.
As a final word, we should be reminded that when work disappears, it weakens and destroys the human condition by decreasing human and social capital, increasing poverty, disempowering even further the disenfranchised and women, and insuring social
exclusion. An employer of last resort policy is likely to reverse these effects. 
